Public opinion and the policy appeasement in the late 1930's

• Most historians assume appeasement enjoyed pubic support.
• Politicians during the 1930s assumed appeasement enjoyed pubic support.
• But news was managed and the media was manipulated to help restrict the public debate to key events and issues.

Difficult to assess the views of ordinary members of the public towards appeasement.

February 1933

Oxford University Union debate - The students present voted 275 -153 in favour of the motion "That this House will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country."

October 1933

The popular interpretation of the election result following the East Fulham by-election is:

"That a Labour candidate, running on policy of disarmament and support for collective security, won by nearly 5,000 votes, overturning a previous Conservative majority of 14,000 in the 1931 election." However, "For most Fulham voters it was almost certainly housing, food prices and employment," that influenced their vote.

(Ted Ranson in Appeasement pamphlet)

January 1934

A survey issued by the Ilford Recorder newspaper included a question on whether or not Britain should go to the assistance of either Germany or France if it was deemed necessary in defence of the Locarno Treaty.

• YES 5,898
• NO18,498

July 1935

Results of Peace Ballot in Britain announced. Showed that British public strongly supported the League and most supported the use of economic sanctions against aggressors such as Italy when Abyssinia was invaded. Dilemma for the British Government back the League against Italy, an action that would destroy the Stresa Front or turn a blind eye to Italian aggression and seal the League's demise?

1936

Pacifism reached a height. The Peace Pledge Union persuaded 130,000 men and women to sign a declaration that they would renounce war.

• Public opinion polls were used in the late 1930s.
• By 1937, polls were taken frequently in Britain and offer an opportunity to assess public opinion.

Polls undertaken by the British Institute of Public Opinion, which undertook monthly surveys of opinion on key issues found that the most favoured foreign policy in the late 1930s was not appeasement but support for the League of Nations and collective security.

• July 1937: 71 per cent of the British public favoured support for the League of Nations as the best method to keep the peace.
• December 1937, 72 per cent still expressed support for the League.

1938

Poll in March 1938 asked, 'Do you support Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy?'

• 58 % said NO
• 26 % said YES
• 16 % expressed no opinion at all.

Mass Observation undertook a detailed study of the Czech crisis in 1938.

• They employed a national panel of 2,000 volunteers who not only collected views from a wide selection of people, but also observed ordinary people at work, in the pub, at home and at the cinema.

• The majority of people interviewed had little knowledge of the issues and most put this down to two factors. One was the high level of government secrecy surrounding the negotiations and the other was a difficulty in comprehending the wide variety of contradictory solutions offered by the newspapers.

August 1938, Mass Observation undertook a national survey on whether the Czech crisis would lead to war. It found:

• 36% thought war likely
• 46% thought it unlikely
• 14% thought there was a fifty-fifty chance
• 4% held no view.
• Most middle-class people interviewed thought there would be no war, while most of the working class felt war was a real possibility.

15 September 1938 a national survey asked the question 'Do you think Chamberlain flying to see Hitler will help peace?'

• 70% thought 'it was a good thing'
• 10% thought it was 'a bad thing'
• 20% were undecided.

When news emerged of the harsh terms imposed on Czechoslovakia at Godesberg, a national poll found:

• 44% of the public were 'indignant',
• 18% were 'pro-Chamberlain'
• 6% believed there would be no war.
• 32% held no firm view at all.

It seems that without the facts, the public was easily misled about the real prospects for peace. It is equally difficult to imagine Chamberlain's conduct of the Czech crisis would have been so popular had the public been allowed full scrutiny of the facts and an open debate of the issues in all areas of the mass media.

A national opinion poll taken shortly after Munich showed:

• 51 per cent 'satisfied' with Chamberlain's actions,
• 39 per cent were 'not satisfied'.

Another poll taken in the same period showed that 86 per cent of the public did not believe Hitler's claim about having 'no more territorial ambitions in Europe'.

It also seems Hitler was a deeply unpopular figure among the vast majority of the British public. Mass Observation noted that when newsreels concerning the Czech crisis appeared, the majority of the audiences booed very loudly whenever they saw Hitler.

In October 1938 a survey of 150,000 youngsters attending the Saturday morning 'Mickey Mouse Club', organised by the Odeon cinema chain was taken. It found that:

• 88% showed a strong dislike of Hitler and Mussolini whenever they appeared on screen
• 53% booed and hissed very loudly whenever they saw either dictator.

News management during the Munich crisis simply postponed the inevitable day when Hitler's openly aggressive designs could no longer be hidden.

1939

In March 1939, the British-Gaumont newsreel commentator said over pictures of German tanks rumbling through the streets of Prague, 'Once again the rattle of a German army on the march echoes throughout Europe.... At Munich, the Fuhrer gave his word that he wanted no more land in Europe. These pictures show you what his words are worth'.

• The growth of the mass media during the inter-war years made the public increasingly more aware of major foreign events.
• The power of the mass media to influence public opinion led the government to think more carefully about how it wanted these events covered.
• The relative freedom enjoyed by the press was not extended to radio and newsreels.
• After 1918, mass democracy had arrived and public opinion did become an important factor in the minds of politicians.

• The BBC and the newsreels allowed themselves to be used as agents of the government during the Czech crisis.
• Open public debate on foreign policy was largely confined to sections of the press, public meetings, street demonstrations and private conversations.
• This careful news management served to keep a small majority in favour of the Munich agreement.
• Euphoria over Munich quickly died away and was replaced by a large amount of anger and discontent. The immediate feeling of relief which followed Munich was soon replaced by anger and bitterness.
• Electoral evidence shows that in the by-elections which followed Munich, in October and November 1938, foreign policy played a dominant role and the national government suffered a substantial fall in its vote.
• The Tories actually lost two safe seats, at Dartford and Bridgwater.
• The Labour Party, which opposed Munich, saw its support rise substantially, even though a year earlier the Economist had remarked, 'For some time now it has become evident that the Labour Party is making no headway in the country'.
• Opposition to Chamberlain's foreign policy was the major factor behind the sharp fall in the Conservative vote in the by-elections which followed Munich.
• The major change in public opinion towards appeasing Hitler, which is often seen to begin with the invasion of Prague, was actually being kept under wraps by a news management of events.
• Public hostility towards Hitler and Nazi Germany was already extremely powerful. Perhaps a poster outside a cinema in the days after Munich summed up the state of British public opinion quite well. It read, 'Chamberlain the Peacemaker: For One Week Only'.